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Nigerian video films, which constitute an industry that has become known as 
Nollywood, have taken not only Nigeria, but the African continent and the world 
by storm. Their phenomenal success and reach are remarkable given the context 
of origin and the poor technical and narrative qualities of the videos. The aim 
of this paper is not to discuss the reasons for this success, but rather to raise 
some ideas regarding the counter-hegemonic possibilities of video films as a 
preliminary for further research and debate.
The paucity of scholarly work on Nigerian video films is indicative of the rapid 
pace at which this industry has grown and continues to expand. The most compre-
hensive work is a collection of essays ranging in discussion from video antecedents 
in Yoruba popular theater, culture and art in Hausa video films to ethnicity, class and 
gender. (Haynes, 2000). Other significant contributions include those by Ukadike 
(2003), Lawuyi (1997), Adejunmobi (2002) and Larkin (2004). Haynes and Onokome 
(2000) and Larkin (2004) in particular touch on aspects of the subversive tendencies 
and potentialities of video films but provide little focused discussion on the precise 
manner in which video films offer a counter-hegemonic potential.
Hegemony as understood in Gramscian terms implies not only dominance 
(political, economic, cultural) of one social class over another, but importantly 
also, the potential for struggle and conflict. This potential for struggle is em-
bedded in the idea that hegemony operates on the basis of consent by the 
dominated class. A characteristic of hegemony is that dominant ideologies are 
packaged as being natural or ‘common sense’ and therefore unquestionably 
right. The result of this is consensus and consent. But this consent has to be 
negotiated at all times because disparities in conditions of material existence 
between the dominant and dominated classes are too transparent for long term 
silence and acquiescence, hence the need to negotiate consent.
This paper suggests some ideas about the counter-hegemonic potential 
of Nigerian video films. In suggesting this counter-hegemonic potential, the pa-
per is not only arguing for a local context but also for a more global context in 
which cinematic production and consumption is determined by the monopolistic 
cinemas of both the West and East.
African Cinema
Political independence for large parts of Africa did not entail either economic or 
cultural independence with regard to film production. Deterrents to the estab-
lishment of a functional and viable film industry in large parts of Africa came in 
the form of lack of finances, inadequately trained technicians, foreign control of 
production facilities, exhibition and distribution and the deployment of cinematic 
language and techniques that were Euro-centric and thus largely alien to local 
African audiences.
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The question of an authentic African cinema has been a problematic one since 
the earliest days of independent cinema in Africa. African filmmakers and theo-
rists such as Med Hondo, Sembene Ousmane, Souleymane Cisse, Djibril Diop 
Mambety, etc have often condemned the influence of the western world in the 
development of a genuine African cinema. This involvement has been at a number 
of levels; technical, financial, market-related and, most importantly for these film-
makers, at the level of cinematic language and aesthetics, as it impacts on cultural 
forms. One of the early concerns of filmmakers such as Sembene was the issue 
of filmmakers being trained and educated in metropolitan centers such as Paris 
and London, in languages and cinematic traditions which alienated them from 
indigenous languages and cultural and traditional practices. And the expressed 
aims of many of these filmmakers was to produce films which could be relevant 
to local audiences, addressing issues of both local and national significance in 
post-independence Africa.
But as Murphy (2000) argues, questions of what is authentically African 
(and authentically western also) are fraught with problems. The debate around 
authenticity, he argues, has to do with questions of “cultural identity and critical 
subjectivity” (Murphy, 2000). But cultural identities on the continent are many 
and varied and representations of these in film present not one unified African 
world view but a multiplicity of world views. The concern of African filmmakers 
as expressed at the second FEPACI meeting in Algiers in 1975 centered on the 
question of Africans filming Africa from an African perspective and eschewing 
cinematic codes of commercial, western cinema. The greatest challenge for 
filmmakers in Africa, however, has been the question of mass support. While 
most of these early filmmakers have consciously geared their conceptions of 
an African cinema as well as their films to an African mass audience, African 
audiences have not responded in like measure. African cinema has therefore 
never been a product of the African people, not in the same way as Nigerian 
video films are very expressly of the Nigerian masses.
Defining African cinema has been a preoccupation not only of African 
filmmakers, theorists and critics, but significantly also, a task that has been 
undertaken by western theorists and critics. Historically, western conceptions 
of African cinema have centered on the didactic messages contained in early 
post-independence films. African film is viewed as African because it reflects on 
African conditions following independence. This conception of African cinema 
is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it places early African cinema 
on a continuum with colonial film, especially in Anglophone Africa1. Secondly, 
as argued by Mhando, it has focused attention on content rather than form, 
thus negating any possibility for the development of auteurism along the lines of 
development in European and, to a lesser extent, Hollywood cinema (Mahndo, 
2005). Thirdly, it fails to recognize the validity of an African aesthetics and form 
of cinematic expression. 
Conceptions of African cinema are problematic for another reason -the 
totalizing nature of the label itself. Defining and categorizing all cinematic pro-
ductions from Africa as examples of African cinema ignores the particularities 
of national, cultural and linguistic significance. It renders invisible the significant 
differences in worldviews, social formations and cultural flows represented in films 
from different regions of Africa, thus perpetuating the stereotype of Africa as one 
landmass and Africans as one people without any distinguishing particularities.
The debate on aesthetics, content, form and style continues to fuel con-
temporary African cinema, which Mbye Cham (2002) believes is beginning to 
1 Colonial film policy towards Africans was expressly framed for a didactic purpose. See for example: Rosaleen 
Smyth (1979) and David Kerr (1993).
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display a greater “diversality”. In other words, some of the contemporary African 
films exhibit a tendency towards greater variety of stories, styles, techniques and 
themes. “Some filmmakers are pushed toward stories presumed to be universal 
either in content, reference, inference or implication, while others opt for the local 
and the particular” (Cham, 2002:3). Furthermore, there is a greater degree of 
cooperation and collaboration between filmmakers across the continent which 
could herald the beginning of African national film industries with the potential 
to coalesce into a continent-wide industry, no longer entirely dependent on 
foreign funding.
How valid is this distinction between diversality and universality in cin-
ematic content, code and style, given the global nature of the contemporary 
world? The philosophy of a global village, argues Mhando, is a western one 
brought about by military and political conquest and maintained now through 
communication and technological influence (Mahndo, 2005:4). Within this 
globalized condition, there is very little that remains specific and local, or even 
unique to any culture and society. 
If the economy, markets and finance capital are the engine of globaliza-
tion, then according to Fredric Jameson, postmodernism is the cultural logic of 
this form of “late capitalism” and is thus the “final and complete incorporation 
of culture into the commodity system.” According to Homer, Jameson under-
stood postmodernism as a purer form of capitalism which intensified the logic 
and commodification of prior forms of capitalism. It marks the final colonization 
of the “last enclaves of resistance to commodification: the Third World, the 
Unconscious and the aesthetics” (Homer, 2005).
Postmodernism as a periodizing concept signals the shift from what Lyo-
tard has identified as grand universalizing narratives to a focus on the more 
parochial and local, creating space for Cham’s diversality. But the paradox of 
postmodernism, according to Stuart Hall, is that the global now locates itself 
at the local and, in doing so, takes the local to the global while simultaneously 
fostering an intensification of ethnic and national identities. In the search for more 
global markets, multinational and finance capital packages itself by appropriating 
the identities and cultural mores of the specific society or country which it wants 
to penetrate. This in turn leads to combative measures from specific national 
companies and societies which emphasize local and regional identities. But 
these identities do not remain regional as they become packaged to be sold on 
the world market. It is within this context of global finance and the universalizing 
of cultural diversity that one has to locate the phenomenon of Nigerian video 
films in order to understand its counter-hegemonic possibilities, if any. 
Ukadike (2003) argues strongly for an understanding of Nigerian (and 
Ghanaian) video films as comprising a real first cinema which can compete with 
the “First Cinema” of the western world on its own terms. He cites a number 
of reasons, the most important being that video films have been successful in 
cultivating a domestic and diasporic African audience which has enabled and 
assured its economic viability.
The SAP and Conditions of Crisis
This economic viability has come about despite, or if one accepts Ukadike’s 
argument, because of the economic failure of measures such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Funds (IMF) imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP), which sought to regenerate the economies of countries such as Ghana 
and Nigeria. Ukadike believes that with the colossal devaluation of the Ghana-
ian cedis and the Nigerian naira, filmmakers in these countries were denied 
access to hard currency with which to purchase film equipment, raw filmstock, 
etcetera. And that given these exigencies, video film, as a cheaper alternative, 
was a natural outlet for creative frustrations. Ukadike is correct to a certain point 
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in that the SAP seems to have laid the basis for the emergence of the video 
film. But his argument can be taken further in that it was not only established 
filmmakers who turned to video as a result of the devalued naira, but that the 
conditions introduced by the SAP were conducive to the formation of a parallel, 
non-official economy based on private ownership. Video films are a staple of this 
parallel economy and have been the means for the entrepreneurial enterprises 
of small and medium businesses and individuals who would otherwise not have 
had access to ownership of any forms of media.
The oil boom of the Seventies pushed Nigeria into the world capitalist oil 
economy, leading to concomitant changes in the domestic economy and society. 
Oil production in Nigeria began in the early Sixties and by 1970 it was one of the 
major oil producers in the world. In 1971, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
was formed within the broader national project of indigenization of the Nigerian 
economy and industry (Beveridge, 1999:319). Between1972-1990, the Nigerian 
government embarked on a process of indigenization in an effort to take control 
of the economy and control private foreign investment. This process enabled the 
compulsory transfer in ownership of certain industries and economic practices 
from private foreign ownership to a mixed state and private indigenous owner-
ship. The aim of indigenization was not to eliminate foreign investment but to limit 
it on the one hand, and on the other to increase the participation of Nigerians 
in the economy.
Section Four of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD), 1972 
listed advertising, media, gambling and retailing, among other economic activities 
as wholly for Nigerians. In addition to these activities, the NEPD of 1977 made 
further additions such as film distribution, newspapers, radio and television as 
economic activities wholly reserved for Nigerians (Beveridge, 1999:309-314). 
Indigenization, however, takes place within a political context of a military regime 
following two coup attempts and a civil war. The impact of this political instability 
was that indigenization was not successful in transforming the economic landscape 
of Nigeria. Economic activity and successful transfer of ownership did not go much 
beyond the Nigerian elites and associates of political and military leaders.
This, coupled with the depression of oil prices in the world market in the 
Eigthies, saw a complete reversal of the indigenization process as more foreign 
investment was sought to offset this recession. Talks with the IMF in early 1983 
failed due to a lack of consensus on key conditions such as the devaluation of 
the naira, trade liberalization and the removal of subsidies on fuel and other com-
modities (Lewis, 2005:82). A comprehensive Structural Adjustment Programme 
was introduced in Nigeria in 1986, a year after General Ibrahim Babangida’s 
assumption of power in August 1985. The SAP incorporated the key policies of 
the World Bank and IMF and resulted in a 66% devaluation of the naira (Lewis, 
2005:82). Following an agreement with the World Bank in 1989, many activi-
ties formerly reserved for Nigerians were opened up to foreign investment and 
ownership. Thus, while formal SAP ended in mid-1988, the Nigerian government 
continued its commitment to key policies. 
The devaluation of the naira as a direct consequence of the SAP impacted 
on the film industry in a number of ways. The opening up of the market to global 
finance capital and increasing levels of privatization led to entrepreneurs buy-
ing up movie houses and converting these into warehouses, churches or other 
places of business, thus shrinking exhibition opportunities not only for local but 
also for foreign films. At a more direct level, the devalued naira was not a strong 
enough currency with which to purchase equipment such as cameras, raw film 
stock, hire huge crews or budget for lavish productions. 
Filmmakers in other parts of Africa faced with similar conditions began to 
look for alternatives. One redress action was the reinvigoration of the Panafri-
can Federation of Filmmakers (FEPACI) into a more active body and lobby for 
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African cinema. Other initiatives included the establishment of the Union des 
Createurs et Entrepreneurs Culturels de l’Afrique (UCECAO), events such as the 
Southern African Film Festival (Zimbabwe), and the Southern African Film and 
Television Market (Sithengi, in South Africa) (Cham, 2002:2). These initiatives 
have been aimed at increasing inter-continental collaboration and cooperation 
between filmmakers, exhibitors and distributors and have been made possible 
due to the political changes in various parts of Africa. The demise of apartheid 
in South Africa and the end of Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) 
and the civil war in Angola have contributed to greater flows and exchanges 
on the continent. 
Nigerian filmmakers and entrepreneurs have, however, followed a different 
trajectory and the prohibitive costs on conventional filmmaking have resulted 
in filmmakers, businessmen and entrepreneurs turning to an alternative and 
cheaper technology: video films. 
Nollywood
Nollywood, as this booming development in Nigerian cinema has come to be 
identified, is worth approximately $45 million annually. Budgets for video produc-
tion can be as little as $4,000 and production time can be between ten days and 
two weeks. A successful title can sell over 100 thousand copies, thus reaping a 
profit of well over 1000%. Videos and VCD discs can sell for between 300 and 
400 naira and there are a large proportion of stalls devoted to the sale of this 
commodity2. That video films are big business in Nigeria is evident from Lawuyi’s 
study of video marketing in Ogbomoso, a town in Kwara State, Nigeria. Of the 
young students interviewed about future employment plans, 12% said that they 
wished to follow trade in radio and television repair which included a side business 
of renting and selling video films (Lawuyi, 1997:480). Fifteen per cent said they 
wished to further their education in the university, while 25% said they wished to 
follow careers in fashion design, and 40% wished to follow trade in textiles.
The ambition of the 12% interested in the television and video business 
was to own a camera and eventually make movies. These movies would be both 
fictionalized, filmed dramas as well as filmed social and cultural events. In this 
instance, video production goes beyond any notions of cinema and assumes a 
more popular usage as recorders of significant social and cultural events such 
as weddings, funerals, naming ceremonies, etc (Barber, 1997: 359). This form of 
popular usage of the video film is emblematic of what Lawuyi refers to as the ‘big 
man’ syndrome, where the bigger and wealthier the patron of the social or cultural 
event, the greater the number of video camera men filming the event (Lawuyi, 
1997:480-481). The number of cameras present may also depend on the number 
of wives the big man has, as each wife would want the ceremony recorded from 
her perspective with greater screen time to her relatives and friends.
Lawuyi argues that video production and significantly ownership of video 
cameras contains the potential for social and political mobility, for big-manism 
especially for those young Nigerians that come from poor backgrounds. The 
tension in Nigerian youth, argues Lawuyi, is between achieving big-manism and 
achieving social and political transformation. Nigerian students and youth have 
been at the forefront of demonstrations in key moments since independence 
in 19603. Videos, in both the consumption and production process, are seen 
as one aspect of political conscientization.
2 From: African and Caribbean Film Festival site.
3 See Beveridge and Lewis for discussion of student protests against the SAP.
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At another and more important level, video technology is a tool for political 
and economic empowerment at both the national and international levels. Larkin 
(2000) argues that the rise of a video culture in Nigeria has been facilitated by 
Nigeria’s integration into the world market as a result of the oil boom. This has 
resulted in Nigeria’s inclusion in the global movement of finance capital, technolo-
gies, people and the cross-flows of cultural and other ideas and practices. And 
following IMF and World Bank dictates, it has also resulted in a highly privatized 
public sphere, especially as regards the ownership of media. According to Larkin, 
this has resulted in a radically new public sphere of media which is defined by 
the privatization and diversification of ownership and access to media (Larkin, 
2000:218). In this new public sphere, the state begins to play a minimal role 
in both the ownership and consequently in the policy, content and ideological 
decisions of the mass media such as radio, television and film.
Significantly also, this privatization of media has created new patterns of 
production and consumption best exemplified by the video film phenomenon. 
For Larkin at least, “[….] the social importance of the electronic media (including 
video film), the publics they create, the social worlds they make meaningful to 
Nigerian audiences, the spaces of political and religious communication they 
foster, are being formed in arenas outside state intervention” (Larkin, 2000:211). 
This highly privatized and decentralized ownership of small media such as video 
film lends itself to expressions of opposition to hegemonic control, in other words, 
video films contain the potential for counter-hegemonic expressions. This po-
tential, however, is denied by African filmmakers, theorists and political activists 
who criticize video films for pandering to and promoting mass consumerism 
and generally failing in the task of political conscientization.
Haynes (2000) identifies Nigerian video films as part of the popular arts or 
popular culture. As a heuristic tool, this identification of Nigerian video films as a 
form of popular culture or the popular arts facilitates analysis which, he argues, 
has been disconnected from classical African film theory and criticism. The 
converse of this of course is that African film has not been considered a popular 
art primarily due to its failure to capture the African mass market. Some of the 
inhibiting factors (which limit the access of African masses to both the production 
and consumption processes) are the same historical factors decried by people 
like Sembene. These include external funding and distribution monopolies and 
technical and aesthetic knowledge not readily available to the African masses. 
For Haynes, identifying video films as a popular art form allows for an 
interdisciplinary approach to their study and analysis, bringing together social 
history, cultural studies, anthropology and literary criticism. African popular arts, 
they argue, is a broad category of cultural forms that occupy the interstices be-
tween the traditional and the modern-elite. Culturally syncretic, they function as 
“brokers between the rural-traditional and the wider world from which modernity 
has been imported” (Haynes, 2000:13).
Okome (2001) argues that video films in Africa can be defined as occupying 
an indeterminate place between television and cinema. Video films for him are 
an example of Africa’s involvement in a “dubious modernity”. It is a “pedestrian 
art” carried out by small entrepreneurial businessmen (Okome, 2001). Okome’s 
definitions imply a negative position for video films and are thus consonant with 
much of the criticism emanating from African cinema practitioners who deride 
video films for their lack of artistic, technical and narrative merit. While some of 
these views and criticisms may in themselves have merit, it is undeniable that 
the reach and success of Nigerian video films commands a revaluation on the 
lines suggested by Haynes.
The versatility in the use of video technology has contributed to the col-
lapse of any distinctions between high and low art. Historically, African cinema 
has been conceived, distributed and exhibited as art films and thus limited to 
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the international festival circuit, art-house movie patrons and very few African 
audiences in Africa. This has been due to a number of factors, some of which 
such as funding, content, and language and the conception of film with a didactic 
purpose have been discussed earlier. This ‘art-house’ conception has removed 
much of African cinema from the marketplace.
In contrast, Nigerian video films are of the marketplace and for the mar-
ketplace. The video film industry is intended for and financed (through sales) by 
a local and diasporic Nigerian mass market. Nigerian filmmakers, according to 
filmmaker Chief Eddie Ugbomha, are “free agents” (Ukadike, 2005). They are 
independent of both big financiers as well as the state, and thus have the creative 
license to raise any issue that will sell on the marketplace. Ugbomah believes 
that film is important because of its enormous impact on society, especially 
given the huge and varied changes affecting societies in contemporary times. 
He sees himself as a social commentator as his films “deal with current events 
and are a statement about societal issues” (Ukadike, 2005).
 It is this social relevance which has contributed in large measure to the 
enormous appeal these video productions have among Nigerians. McCall (2005) 
identifies it as a “largely grassroots phenomenon”, a “folk cinema” which is en-
tirely distinct from any other cinematic productions either of African or foreign 
origin. With the Yoruba domination of video production, it would not be wrong 
to think of these video films as derivatives of Yoruba popular theater. Accord-
ing to Ugbomah, “the Yoruba have been able to lift the stage onto celluloid” 
(Ukadike, 2005:156).
This mass, popular appeal of Nigerian video films persists despite the low 
quality of the product. Production values, the speed with which the films are 
produced and the technology (video technology cannot compare by any means 
to celluloid in terms of image quality) are factors in the low quality of the produc-
tions. Their popular success, therefore, has to be the result of something other 
than production quality. Perhaps the answer lies in the thematic and narrative 
content of the films or the stars that have emerged, or the generic conventions 
that video films employ, or any number of combinations of these and other fac-
tors. The biggest consumers of Nigerian video films are housewives who are 
wealthy enough to own either a video or DVD player. The poorer of the society 
watch these films in “video theaters, originally little more than a spare room in 
someone’s house” with video projection facilities4.
 The widespread and successful reach of Nigerian video films is largely 
due to media piracy which, Larkin argues, is part of the “organizational archi-
tecture of globalization”, providing an infrastructure which permits media goods 
to circulate (Larkin, 2004:289). For Larkin, video films would not exist without 
what he calls the infrastructure of piracy. Piracy has facilitated the existence and 
ensured the reach of video films in two distinct ways. Firstly, “piracy operates as 
a corruption of the communication infrastructure”, thus allowing Nigerians with 
no access to the formal economy to create and operate a non-formal, parallel 
economy with global links to parallel economies in places such as Singapore 
and Dubai (Larkin, 2004:295). This has led to a proliferation of media products 
such as films, music and religious sermons (local and international) which can 
be duplicated on video and audio cassettes and distributed through formal 
channels, such as established outlets, as well as informal channels, such as 
travelling salesmen who take these products to much of rural Africa.
Nigeria, Larkin argues, is the largest market for pirate goods in Africa, with 
estimates suggesting that up to 70% of the current gross domestic product (GDP) 
is being derived from this non-formal economy. But rather than disempowering 
4 African and Caribbean Film Festival site.
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the state, this has instead reconfigured not only the state as he suggests, but 
also traditional power structures at both the local and global levels. The decen-
tralized ownership of media (as evidenced in video production) is taken a step 
further within this shadow economy with the scale of distribution that piracy is 
able to stimulate. If modern technology was part of the colonial mission to civilize, 
then the introduction of video technology in post-colonial Nigeria especially, has 
enabled Nigerians to become dominant media practitioners at a global level.
Secondly, piracy has stimulated and sustained the video boom at the level 
of the technical and aesthetic quality of films. Piracy of both western and Indian 
films in large numbers on video machines that degenerate the image and sound 
quality of the film has in a sense paved the way for low technical and aesthetic 
value in even non-pirated media. Larkin’s argument is that “piracy standardized 
a particular quality of production” which is borne out by the seeming agreement 
of Nigerian producers and distributors that Nigerian audiences would not neces-
sarily pay higher prices for better sound and image quality (Larkin, 2004:303).
This is largely due to a culture of breakdown and repair where technology 
as a culture is experienced in very distinct ways in Nigeria. Larkin’s contention 
that technology (in the form of televisions, VCRs, telephones and even energy 
supplies) often comes to a grinding halt due to breakdown is borne out by 
Lawuyi’s study discussed earlier, where the television and video repair business 
was the occupation of choice for at least twelve percent of youth surveyed. As 
a consequence of the devalued naira and economic disarray, Nigeria is the re-
cipient of second-hand, used technology originating from Europe. Breakdowns, 
expiration of parts, and consequent innovations in repairs and parts all contribute 
to a cycle of breakdown and repair ultimately creating a culture of technology 
that is informed by the limits and utility of technology itself. As Larkin argues, 
this is a condition of both poverty and innovation (Larkin, 2004:305-306).
This innovation at the level of technology has however not replicated itself 
at the narrative level of the video films that are produced. Nigerian video films 
are a broad category that includes Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, pidgin and English 
language films that are largely grounded in the ethnic communities from which 
they originate. Films in English have the greatest prestige and receive the widest 
distribution outside Nigeria. Films are in most cases identifiable on the basis of 
thematic and narrative content. Romance dramas dominate Hausa film produc-
tion, while melodramas are distinctly Yoruba and Igbo, and English language 
films are predominantly action packed (Larkin, 1997).
Thematic trends very often pit tradition and modernity in an antagonistic 
duality of the classic good and bad. Tradition in romance dramas is linked to 
obedience to family wishes in respect of marriage partners while modernity is 
evil incarnated in individualism and independence. Linked to this tradition/mo-
dernity dichotomy is the rural/urban divide where once again the urban center 
is representative of the evils of modernity; greed, power, lust.
A strong component of most Nigerian video films is a preoccupation with 
the occult. Adejunmobi links this occult preoccupation with a quest for wealth. 
The occult is very often consulted and deployed in the search for wealth, power 
and/or fame, and though characters may enjoy the fruits of their pursuit for wealth, 
in many instances they come to a bad end in the film. This, argues Adejunmobi, 
points to a contradiction characteristic of contemporary Nigerian society; the 
veneration of wealth and excessive consumption as well as the notion that wealth 
corrupts and retribution will be dealt to the corrupt (Adejunmobi, 2002).
But whether through the use of occult forces or not, wealth and con-
sumption are a stock feature of most Nigerian videos and not only those in the 
English language, as Adejunmobi argues. Nigerian video films are manifestly 
about aspirations, most frequently aspirations for wealth and a lavish lifestyle 
(big-manism as discussed earlier), but also for love and happiness that finds a 
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suitable balance between family and community injunctions and a conception 
of individualism and independence of thought and action. 
The progression towards big-manism, argues Barber, is a process of self-
creation through real and imagined (viewed) displays of wealth and consumption. 
According to her, Nigerian video dramas conceive the audience as a “horizon 
of consumption where what is consumed is the spectacle of others’ more con-
spicuous consumption (Barber, 1997:353). Home videos in their recording of 
social and cultural events, are similarly spectacles of consumption. 
For Haynes and Okome, images of lavish lifestyles and indiscriminate 
wealth contain two possibilities. These are viewed firstly as expressions of a 
middle-class vision of itself and secondly, as a “turbulent dream by and for 
the masses” (Haynes, 2000:79) It is possible that they believe this because 
the Nigerian society is less rigid in class formation and identity as compared 
to European societies. This once again appears to be a consequence of the 
oil boom of the seventies and the economic collapse and widespread poverty 
of the eighties and nineties. This has created the potential for any Nigerian to 
aspire to and attain enormous wealth, power and privilege.
Some Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have wanted to argue that Nigerian video films do contain and 
realize the potential for a counter-hegemonic cinema that is rooted in a very 
specific society and culture. They are counter-hegemonic, not because they 
may have broken with western hegemonizing cinematic codes, nor because 
they display any creative genius in terms of an authentic African film aesthet-
ics, but rather because they operate outside the market, i.e., the global market 
dominated by finance capital. 
Nigerian video films are an entirely independent entity. They are not financed 
either by private investors or the government. They are not bought by monopoly 
capital for the purpose of global distribution and exhibition. But despite this, they 
are an economically viable product. The industry is sustained by domestic sales. 
It has a global cinematic reach despite the lack of interest from multinational 
distribution and exhibition companies. This reach is due to the widely scattered 
diaspora who take these video films with them and who appear to replicate the 
local marketing and exhibition conditions that prevail within Nigeria.
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